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Abstract: This manuscript investigates the facts of publication of the images of the Nanking
Atrocity (December 1937–January 1938) in LIFE and LOOK magazines, two widely read United
States publications, as well as the Nanking atrocity film clips that circulated to millions more in
American  and  Canadian  newsreels  some years  later.  The publishers  of  these  images  were
continuing the art of manipulation of public opinion through multimodal visual media, aiming
them especially at the less educated mass public. The text attempts to describe these brutal
images in their historical context. Viewing and understanding the underlying racial context and
emotive impact of these images may be useful adjuncts to future students of World War II. If it
is difficult to assert how much these severe images changed public opinion, one can appreciate
how the emerging visual culture was transforming the way that modern societies communicate
with and direct their citizens' thoughts.
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1. Introduction
In 2008, the seventieth anniversary  of  the  Nanking
Atrocity  passed with  limited international  interest  in
the  event  that  marked  Japan's  depredations  in  the
Chinese capital city of Nanking (Nanjing) from Decem-
ber 1937 through January 1938. The event, including
the wholesale murder of captured soldiers and civil-
ians, and the rape of thousands of women, later be-
came iconic as the "Rape of Nanking". This study will
investigate the facts of publication of the images from
Nanking in the weeks and months following the event,
in LIFE and LOOK magazines, two new United States
photograph journals competing with each other and
with  the  newsreels.  They  claimed  a  readership  of
seventeen  million  and  one  million  respectively.  The
photograph journals' images were Japanese soldiers'
'souvenir stills', not meant for publication, but smuggled
out of China to the West. Several western observers in
the International Safety Zone filmed evidence of the
human tragedy surreptitiously,  but  their  images  did
not appear in newsreels until several years later. The
publication of the still and moving atrocity photographs
were a kind of novelty, signaling a shift in what public
decorum would now tolerate. A few years later, the
bloodbath of World War II achieved a new reality. As
Susan Sontag generalized, photographs were a species
of rhetoric that reiterated, simplified, agitated and created
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an illusion of consensus. Their daily pervasiveness during
the conflict perhaps began to dull, if not corrupt the
senses leading to our contemporary world of image
saturation  that  Sontag  believed  diminishes  morality
and even numbs viewers to the point of indifference.
If brutal images from Spain's civil war had begun this
decade's cascade of horror in 1936, the Nanking im-
ages elevated shock effect. Incidentally, they helped
to sell  millions  of  magazines ([1],  Sontag extended
these thoughts in a provocative article in 2002 [2]).
By the 1930's photo-magazines were recognizable
adjuncts of the news business in Europe, the Soviet
Union  and  the  United  States.  Two  features  about
them are striking:
Photographs dominated their pages and the stories
were  generally  simple  or  captions  alone.  They  ap-
pealed  to  a  readership  that  was,  as  an  aggregate,
young and more inclined to learn from pictures than
from written sources. Second, these media tended to
serve as mirrors and reinforcements of the dominant
ideology of the country of origin. In Britain, for ex-
ample,  Picture  Post came into  existence  in  October
1938 and under the editorial guidance of Stefan Lor-
ant and Tom Hopkinson, devoted itself  to reflecting
the national mood as the economically depressed na-
tion slid toward the precipice of war while also appeal-
ing to the perennial whimsies of a young generation
[3]. Its picture stories combined social comment with
reportage to promote a kind of left-liberal humanitari-
anism to which the establishment had to adapt. Im-
portantly, it introduced 'new ways of seeing' derived
from radical publishing in Europe into the commercial
culture that appealed to a new and growing audience.
The multiple characteristics of picture magazines was
their  reductive  simplicity,  emotional  appeal,  and yet
serious intent to inform. In the United States, Life and
Look magazines shared these values as business ven-
tures trying to build a readership of millions and to
compete with newsreels to deliver the visual rhetoric
of a world in action. Of course there were exceptions
to the Life and Look approach. For example, Agee and
Evans  "Let  Us  Now Praise  Famous  Men",  originally
produced  for  Fortune magazine  with  governmental
financing, was unique in its even-handed grappling of
what Agee called the "cruel radiance of what is" of
America's hard edged social realities. It was also re-
miniscent of the more sober  Illustrated America and
Harper's Weekly in the 1890s.
Edward Bernays and Walter Lippmann were influ-
ential thinkers in the 1920s who explored the role of
public opinion in a democracy. The former was espe-
cially important in articulating the rules of modern ad-
vertising while the latter believed that in a democracy,
an educated elite should direct and manipulate public
opinion.  Both  built  upon  an  existing  understanding
that emotions kindled by imagery tended to be an ef-
fective way to reach the millions of malleable citizens.
Lippmann had said it  was impossible to credibly in-
form the masses on important issues and then ask
them to decide; decision was the job of the educated
elite. John Grierson, a Scotsman from Britain who was
studying  public  opinion  in  the  United  States  at  the
University  of  Chicago,  argued  with  Lippmann  and
claimed that half the equation was valid: it was pos-
sible, he believed, to use the emotional appeal of im-
agery to educate and motivate the individual in order
to give him a the feeling of having a stake in society.
Grierson  returned  to  Britain  to  apply  the  power  of
visual rhetoric to documentary film. Besides informing
and moving the viewer, he found one great strength
of film was its appeal to the young, to the marginally
educated, and to those semi-literate who did not read
much at all. He understood that the typical citizen was
more adrift than not, and that emotional imagery, in
the form of the creative treatment of actuality, provided
another  form  of  factual  education.  He  claimed  the
purpose of documentary was propaganda as education;
its images could create democratic loyalties and intelli-
gent understanding of the contemporary world. Grierson
never denied that given a typical audience, document-
ary film, photojournalism and newsreel photography
all exhibited a lack of intellectual rigor. They tended
toward  the  sensational  and  sentimental,  but  those
were the elements that impelled millions to act. In the
complex world of the 1930s, there was a concerted
struggle to use images to attract the loyalties of their
citizens [4].
Whether they were images from the Spanish Civil
War or Japanese depredations in Asia, the object of
the new visual  culture was to treat the unimagined
experience and to render it emotional ([5], pp. 9–14,
47, 57, 62). Images of children figured often because
they were blameless victims of social circumstances.
As we shall see, the photograph of a child casualty in
the 1937 Japanese bombardment of Shanghai's railway
station  evoked  cognitive  emotional  empathy,  moral
awareness, and identification with alien victimization.
That photo, whether candid or arranged, became so
iconic, that today it stands as a lifelike sculpture that a
visitor sees first when entering the Nanking Massacre
Memorial Hall (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Baby Ping-Mei. Source: Karin Doerr.
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Because Asia remained an alien bailiwick for west-
ern  correspondents,  there  were  not  many  still  and
moving images that had emerged from China, at war
with Japan since 1931. If the American public's reac-
tion to the still photographs from Nanking was gener-
ally one of shock, there seemed to be a somewhat
indifferent  long-term  emotional  involvement,  due
likely to inherent western racism or the remoteness of
a conflict that was 3000 miles away. Archibald MacLeish
once referred to such reaction as "the superstition of
distance", being so far away, a viewer might conclude
that violence, lies and murder on another continent
were not believable ([5], p. 137). Racism, remoteness,
incredulity,  and  paucity  of  correspondents  are  ele-
ments that anchor this study of the Nanking Atrocity's
images.
As George Roeder Jr. stated in his seminal study of
the American visual experience in World War II, it is
difficult to assume precisely measurable or predictable
effects of still and moving images upon public opinion
in  wartime  America  ([6],  pp.  1–25,  81–104).  The
same applies prior to the war, although there was sig-
nificant  interest  in  visual  depiction of  world  events,
from Spain's civil war to Japanese militarism in Asia.
In January 1938 the American public flocked to see to
the newsreel footage of the Japanese bombing of the
American cruiser Panay outside Nanking. It was a vi-
cariously  lived  experience,  and  not  long  afterward,
Life and Look's still photographs of the Japanese de-
predations within the city probably added to growing
American outrage at Japan ([7], pp. 3–14; [8]). In the
context of the time, emotion triggered moral revulsion
and both elements reinforced the humanist western
tradition.
Still it took years and actual war for the smuggled
Nanking atrocity film clips to circulate in American and
Canadian newsreels. In the United States, as part of
basic  training,  millions of  recruits  saw the  Why We
Fight series in which the virulent phrase the 'Rape of
Nanking' became a popular slogan; millions more saw
the same series in and out of theatres. In Canada,
these and other film images were matched to a cari-
cature of the duplicitous Japanese enemy as individu-
ally  trustworthy  yet  collectively  treacherous.  The
residual impact of these and the still photographs that
Americans saw cannot be measured scientifically, but
in the modernist tradition of moral integrity, their propa-
ganda value was clear. Once war came, the American
newsreel treatment of the Japanese aggressors was
overtly racist; the Canadian propaganda effort, headed
by John Grierson, used actual and manufactured atro-
city footage to demonstrate fanatic Japanese militarism
in order to strengthen Canadian national morale. The
lasting  (anti-Japanese  racial)  impression  created  by
Canadian theatrical newsreels would impel the public,
already bitter over Japanese abuse of Canadian prison-
ers  of  war,  to  mobilize  in  common purpose.  If  one
American epithet referred to the Japanese racially as
"buck-toothed," Canadians saw Chinese-staged (black
propaganda)  images  of  Japanese  soldiers  attacking
women and bayonetting a baby. For both countries,
the newsreels' use of gruesome Nanking images ac-
companied by a cascade of explanatory verbiage and
moral invective reflected an informational world where
news was as much about emotional imagery as about
fact. 
As applied to today's geopolitical tensions between
China and Japan, images and words continue to res-
onate regarding events related to Nanking ([9], see
[10]). The best-selling book by the late Chinese-Amer-
ican author,  Iris  Chang,  echoed the  Holocaust  as  a
paradigm of memorial culture, referring to the Nank-
ing tragedy in  her  title  as  'the  forgotten holocaust'
([11], see also [12]), causing instant controversy for
its inaccurate association with the genocide of Europe's
Jews  [13,14].  In  2007–2008,  the  Chinese  diaspora
was reminded of the memory of the atrocity both in
print and in three films by a Chinese, Japanese, and
western filmmaker [15]. Debate continues to revolve
around Japan's refusal to acknowledge fully and publicly
its responsibility as a perpetrator. The impressment of
Korean women as sex slaves is now a more familiar
issue while Nanking is a less cited symbol of Japanese
sexual  ravages  of  Nanking  women  and  the  related
brutality of its civilians. This may be because none of
the  world  economic  powers  wishes  old  wounds  to
cause a breach in the thrust of today's consumerist
world  economy.  Besides,  China  is  very  reluctant  to
allow the genie of public anger to percolate through its
population,  lest  it  lead  to  unintended  political  con-
sequences for  itself.  This  study  concludes  that  the
images and doctored footage from Nanking should be
included as part of understanding a general cultural
shift that accorded visual images a new respect. What
remains difficult to gauge is the impact of exposure to
these barbaric images. Then, they were part of the
need to mobilize public  opinion for  war.  Today, one
fears they will not be used out of context as part of a
growing public acceptance of, or indifference to the
saturation of obscene images. If employed judiciously
and  in  context,  they  may  lead  new generations  of
students of World War II to grasp the impact of visual
imagery on mass populations.
2. Background
Japan had set up a puppet regime in Manchuria fol-
lowing its 1931 invasion. In July 1937, using a skir-
mish as a pretext to attack Shanghai, Japan launched
a full scale invasion of China proper. Nationalist forces
under Chiang Kai-Shek fought fiercely, but were de-
feated by aerial bombardment and superior Japanese
troops.  Chinese  nationalist  armies  withdrew  to  the
capital of Nanking, slowing the Japanese advance by
using a scorched earth policy that left the enemy no
food  and  little  shelter,  a  policy  that  caused  the
Chinese civilian population much grief. The Japanese
were surprised by the ferocity of the nationalist forces'
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resistance and vowed revenge. Nanking's pre-invasion
civilian population of one million was already reduced
by up to three quarters before the Japanese assault
by  200,000  troops.  When  they  reached Nanking  in
December, the Chinese nationalists had laid waste key
buildings and moved the capital to Chungking. Chiang
withdrew the majority of his troops, leaving 75,000 to
defend the city. As the invaders took and sealed off
Nanking, 50,000 Japanese soldiers unleashed a cam-
paign  of  unrestrained  brutality.  Emperor  Hirohito's
uncle, Prince Asaka, issued an order, "Kill All Captives".
This  encouraged  lower  echelon  Japanese  officers,
short of supplies and anxious to build morale, to issue
a policy of "Burn All, Loot All, Kill All".
Unobserved by world media and contradicting their
own propaganda about kind Japanese soldiers, Japan-
ese forces engaged in a murderous rampage until the
end of January 1938. They sought out and machine-
gunned or bayoneted tens of  thousands of  Chinese
soldiers  who had  surrendered.  The victims  believed
they were to be imprisoned, not shot by gunners hid-
den behind camouflaged walls. Thousands more civil-
ian males of military age met a similar fate. In the
final  disgrace,  troops  raped  indiscriminately  some
20,000 Chinese women and girls, many of whom they
murdered. The postwar Tokyo Tribunal established the
"traditionalist"  victim total  of  300,000 [16] that has
been accepted as valid ever since [17,18]. Japan denies
responsibility for letting loose and ordering its soldiers
to perpetrate war crimes [19-21].
In  Nanking,  journalists  Hallett  Abend  and  Frank
Tillman Durdin of  The New York Times  reported on
the unfolding tragedy on 10–11 December 1937. Their
photographs depicted Chinese refugees, some waiting
to be admitted to the "safe" International Safety Zone
that foreign residents had established. As the city fell,
journalists left Nanking to file their stories in Shanghai.
They were not allowed to return until the end of Janu-
ary. So there were neither photographs nor western
journalists  to  witness  the  fall  of  Nanking  on  14
December. In fact, the news focus shifted dramatically
on 13 December, when The New York Times reported
that  Japanese  planes  had  attacked  the  American
gunboat Panay not far from Nanking, resulting in the
loss of several lives. The  Times' photograph showed
the Panay in its death throes after its crew and pas-
sengers  had  abandoned  ship.  For  the  next  three
weeks, the sinking of the Panay remained front page
news in many U.S. newspapers [22]. On 15–17, 19–
21, 25, 26, and 28 December, the lead stories in the
Times  dealt with Japan's insistence the  Panay  attack
was  an error,  for  which  it  proffered apologies  (and
eventual  restitution).  In  the  midst  of  the  hysteria
about the gunboat, Durdin filed a story from Shanghai
on  17  December  that  news  reports  of  atrocities  at
Nanking were like "…stories of war hundreds of years
ago…when…a conquered city with its helpless inhabit-
ants should be given over for twenty-four hours to the
unbridled lust of the victors" ([23], p. 8). He concluded,
"[the]  terrorized  population  lives  in  fear  of  death,
torture  and  robbery".  On  18  December,  under  the
banners "Butchery Marked Capture of Nanking" and
"All  Captives Slain",  he reported the blanket looting
and violation of women with a detailed description of
Japanese depredations and rapes. He reported on 27
December  that  chaos  and  anarchy  were  facts  in
Japanese-occupied  provinces;  the  story  included  a
picture of Japanese troops marching to Nanking, but
none from the city itself. 
On the same day,  LIFE published a pictorial essay
on the  Panay,  using frames from the film that  two
newsreel photographers, Norman Alley and Eric Mayell,
had shot while on board the doomed vessel. The ship
sinking was the main story, and absence of dramatic
photographs left the Nanking collapse a poor second.
In the pre-television age, the public had developed an
appetite for the visually stimulating experience of the
newsreel (Figure 2).
The next day, the Times played up the Panay incid-
ent  not  only  because  American  national  honor  had
been compromised, but also because there was a film
record of the attack on their neutral ship. The footage
was speeding its way across the ocean and continent,
soon to  appear  in  newsreels.  This  raised significant
public  anticipation  and  on  30  December,  newsreel
theatres reported lines around the block.
This fed the Panay hysteria even more. LIFE repor-
ted that audiences allegedly broke into repeated ap-
plause after seeing the heroism of the ship's officers
and civilians. Few knew that President Roosevelt had
asked that the most damning footage, showing Japan-
ese  planes  coming  at  the  Panay at  deck  level,  be
censored. This was probably because negotiations re-
garding Japan's willingness to apologize and indemnify
the United States were at a critical juncture. The foot-
age was cut. Washington learned through code breaking
that  atrocities  were  occurring  in  Nanking  but  their
source remained top secret. Without newsreel footage
and correspondents'  confirmation from Nanking, the
public remained focused on the Panay spectacle (see
[20,24]). For three weeks, newspapers in the United
States made so much of the  Panay sinking, that the
Nanking  Atrocity  took  a  poor  second  in  influencing
pro-China and anti-Japan public opinion [25,26].
Figure 2. Sinking of the SS Panay. Source: The
Denver Post/ Getty Images.
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One can argue that  the  public's  response to  the
Panay sinking took precedence because it was obvious
that there was a shared national concern about the fate
of one of its ships. It was only much later that stories
appeared  in  mainstream  print  outlets  like  Time,
Reader's Digest and Far Eastern filed by the western
witnesses  in  the  Nanking  International  Safety  Zone
[27,28]. By then, time had diminished the newsworthy
immediacy of the event [29,30].
Henry  Luce  owned  LIFE, TIME  and  FORTUNE
magazines. Born in China to American missionary par-
ents,  he remained a lifelong champion of  his  birth-
place and was probably America's most cogent pro-
China spokesperson ([31],  pp.  28,  30; [32,33]).  He
launched LIFE as a weekly news magazine in Novem-
ber 1936, with a strong emphasis on photojournalism.
By  1938,  he  claimed  its  circulation  was  17  million.
With some prescience, a full week before the fall  of
Nanking,  LIFE ran a cover picture of a Japanese sol-
dier with a machine gun and the caption "Fatalist With
Machine Gun". The issue featured Japan's conquest of
Asia, with one story about Japanese soldiers, head-
lined  "Japan's  Army  Slogs  Down  Asia  on  Schedule
Time". To a long shot of Japanese soldiers marching,
the caption remarked "happy at their work". 
LOOK magazine, competing with the more popular
LIFE, also celebrated America as a middle class exper-
ience. As a  general-interest magazine, it  cultivated a
largely superficial approach to contemporary society,
filling its pages with  photographs of  movie stars and
casual or striking events. Because it took months to
set up its biweekly issue, on 21 December 1937 LOOK
ran a photomontage of the August 1937 bombing of
Shanghai. It was a tragedy unrelated to the disaster
unfolding in Nanking. Using frames of moving picture
film shot by Hearst cameraman Wong Hai-Sheng, one
shot  became one of  the  most  iconic  of  the prewar
period, showing a baby sitting amidst the wreckage of
a bombed out Shanghai railway station [34,35] (Fig-
ure 3).  LOOK's account of the barbarity of Japanese
aerial  warfare shocked the world. An estimated 136
million people saw the shot on newsreel screens or in
print  ([36],  p.  260).  United  China  Relief  used  this
image to sell millions of Christmas cards and to raise
millions of dollars for Chinese aid. Titled the Ping Mei
card, the reverse side read: "This is Ping Mei—a child
of  China—…he  is  one  of  50  million  refugees  who
desperately need food, clothing, shelter, medical aid".
Time magazine published it too, while appealing for
money  and  underscoring  the  common  interest  and
goals shared by the Chinese and Americans ([37], p.
55; [38,39]).
LOOK's  use of emotive captions added weight to
the  frames of  the  bombed railway station.  Its  two-
page feature titled "A Chinese Baby Survives an Air
Raid"  displayed  five  frames  including  the  above
mentioned event with a Chinese rescuer in the image
(Figure 4).
A  first  picture  explained the  image of  a  Chinese
man picking up the infant lying on the railroad tracks
half hidden under the wreckage. A second still showed
the man carrying the baby through the wreckage. A
third photograph had him crossing the track to a plat-
form while the caption explained the unannounced Ja-
panese attack on this civilian facility. A fourth photo-
graph depicted the infant, an older child standing next
to his rescuer, the wreckage, and a dead child lying on
the tracks nearby.  The caption read: "…a child and
man approach (above) to take the baby to a near-by
first aid station. At the right lies the body of  a 14-
year-old boy, one of the 15 children found dead in the
raid.  In  bombing Shanghai,  Japan struck at  China's
largest,  wealthiest  city.  Planes  also  have  bombed
Nanking, China's capital". The shameful image of the
lone infant victim was evocative propaganda, a picture
triggering a natural human response of revulsion. This
iconic  image  helped  construct  a  collective  memory
about the horrors of Japanese aggression and public
discourse revolved around it  as the Luce publishing
empire helped keep it alive ([40], see [41,42]) (Figure 5).
Figure 3. Baby Ping-Mei. Source: LOOK Magazine.
Figure  4. Filmed  images  of  baby  Ping-Mei.
Source: LOOK Magazine.
Figure  5. Rescue  of  baby  Ping-Mei.  Source:
LOOK Magazine.
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Situating the photograph in a related, but different
context, a final photograph caption, titled "Lying on a
Stretcher", depicted the infant on a sidewalk, receiving
"first aid from a Chinese boy scout…" The text contin-
ued, "three weeks later, on the occasion of the Japan-
ese bombing of Nanking, the governments of the U.S.,
Britain  and  France  sent  a  note  of  protest  to  the
Japanese government against the bombing of civilian
populations. But aerial raids continue, with an increas-
ing toll  of  dead.  Chinese  bombers and gunners,  as
well as Japanese, have been responsible for some of
the  deaths  of  innocent  non-combatants—American
and European as well as Oriental—in this undeclared
war" (International News photographs [34]).
The undoctored newsreel footage indeed revealed
a tragic and hopeful moment, the rescue of a baby
after Japan bombed the railway station, intentionally
or not. Yet the arrangement of film frames could lead
a doubter or denier to claim that perhaps the entire
event  was  staged  for  the  camera  or  the  baby was
placed on the track after his rescue and then left to
cry. The more significant historical fact remains that
this child became the icon that spoke of Japan's care-
less attack on innocents in a civilian locale. One notes
how different the film clip appears compared with the
verbiage attached to the still frames.
While it  is  difficult to measure the impact of this
visual news item in isolationist America, a Gallup Poll
taken late in 1937 revealed that if the Ohio floods in-
terested Americans most in the preceding year (28.3%),
the Sino-Japanese war had practically the same effect
(27.8%). By May 1939, seventeen months after the
Nanking atrocities,  polls  revealed that  sympathy for
Chinese rose from 43% in August 1937 to 74% ([37],
pp. 45, 46).
Having  covered  the  Panay story  in  December
exclusively, LIFE did not want to be scooped by LOOK,
so its editors ran a grisly photograph on 10 January
1938: a severed Chinese head with a cigarette in its
mouth (Figure 6).
The macabre text read in dramatic language that
echoed Time  magazine: "Chinese head whose owner
was incorrigibly anti-Japanese, wedged in barbed wire
barricade  outside  Nanking  just  before  the  city  fell
December 14…Quite possibly the worst holocaust [43]
in modern history took place behind an official news
silence in China's capture capital of Nanking between
December 10 and 18…In the indescribable confusion
the  Japanese  shot  down everyone seen  running  or
caught in a dark alley. In the safety zone 400 men
were tied together and marched off to be shot. A few
uninvestigated cases of rape were reported…The Ja-
panese army permitted organized looting by its men
presumably because its supplies are getting low…"
This atrocity photograph would not likely have been
published if it had depicted a Caucasian victim [44].
The fact was that once World War II began, Life was
so reluctant to publish images of American dead, that
its first such photograph appeared only in September
1943, eleven months after the soldiers depicted had
died in battle. Life's editorial decision to let the Nank-
ing photograph out reflected a double standard: the
Oriental  as  Other  and  a  feeling  that  many  viewers
would consider the sight of Orientals murdering each
other as nothing more than a confirmation of Asian
barbarism, as opposed to eliciting sympathy, horror or
motivating action.
The article ignored the issue of widespread rape,
choosing a photograph of a Chinese father carrying a
baby mortally wounded by a Japanese bomb fragment
and another of Chinese soldiers and civilians at a city
gate  with  Japanese  soldiers  hauling  carts  of  looted
supplies.  Its caption read, "the organized looting of
Nanking would indicate that the Japanese Army Com-
missariat needs food more than prestige". A two-page
photograph spread followed, of Nanking refugees on 5
December fleeing on a Yangtze riverboat. The text de-
fended the Nationalists' scorched earth policy as the
way to defeat the Japanese [45].
While  both  LOOK  and  LIFE  had  published  pho-
tomontages reporting the military debacle in Nanking,
because virtually all correspondents had been evacu-
ated, there were no visuals conveying the scope of vi-
olations  and  breadth  of  the  massacre.  LOOK  ran  a
feature  on  war  propaganda  on  15  February  1938
without  defining  what  constituted  war  propaganda,
good or bad. One page was devoted to Shanghai vic-
tims, depicting an old woman and a child, a mother
nursing  her  infant,  and  another  carrying  her  child
through Shanghai streets. The pain of innocent civil-
ians  was  clear,  yet  public  decorum  still  demanded
avoidance of the obscenity of death and blood.
On  18  April  LIFE  covered  the  Nanking  massacre
again with text that informed the American public of
the depredations in detail. "These are the same sol-
diers  who  through  last  Christmas  and  New  Year's
treated Nanking, China's captured capital, to the most
appalling  mass  atrocity  since  Genghis  Khan.  They
raped Chinese women by the thousands, bayoneted
and  burned  unarmed  Chinese  men  alive  in  equal
numbers, suffered the inevitable loss of morale. Since
then the Japanese have been stopped and defeated
by the Chinese" [46].
Figure  6. Severed  Chinese  head.  Source:  AP
Photo.
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The photograph of Japanese soldiers dozing harm-
lessly in a Chinese temple did nothing to illuminate or
nuance the text. Three weeks later,  LIFE  displayed a
series of photographs of Chinese child actors touring
the countryside in a propaganda play about Chinese
farmers uniting against a Japanese bully. In order to
widen the propaganda effect of Chinese resistance, on
16 May, LIFE put a head shot of a determined looking
Chinese soldier on its cover with the caption "Defend-
er of China".
The  accompanying  feature  boasted  (incorrectly)
that China was putting the Japanese army on the run
and that China's odds to win were better than 50-50. 
A  powerful  addition  was  a  series  of  ten  photo-
graphs of Japanese atrocities, frames taken from un-
attributed  film  footage.  American  missionary  John
Magee had filmed hospitalized victims surreptitiously
in the International Safety Zone during the chaos, and
fellow American John Fitch smuggled this footage out
of China early in 1938. Fitch circulated it to limited
American audiences to inform them of Japanese bru-
tality, but exhausted by his efforts, he soon ceased his
one-man campaign. Perhaps because events in distant
Asia had less resonance than almost daily Eurocentric
news, the film lay dormant until 1942, when portions
of it  appeared in a Canadian newsreel [47,48]. The
above  stills  were  preceded  by  the  text:  "the  most
dreadful picture of the rape of Nanking this amateur
photographer could not take. He knew that if he filmed
civilians being shot down or houses looted and burned,
he would be arrested and his camera smashed. Besides
he was too busy, like other foreign missionaries and
doctors,  saving what civilians he could.  But for two
weeks he saw an army completely out of control, raping,
burning,  killing  and  robbing  and  destroying  without
check. He saw a Japanese embassy completely power-
less  to restrain its own men. In foreign hospitals in
and  around  Nanking  he  saw hundreds  of  innocent
victims of 'totalitarian war".
Accompanying each photograph was an explanation:
1.  Wounded  Chinese  in  primitive  basket  who  was
transported to emergency facility. 2. Survivor of family
of  11  standing  among  bodies  3.Wounded  woman
whose husband and  child  were  killed.  4.  Disfigured
burned man, tied with 100 others, doused with gasoline.
5. Man with bayonet gashes, who refused to yield his
women to Japanese. 6. Woman nearly decapitated 7.
A 14-year-old  boy beaten with  an iron  bar.  8.  Man
(police) struck with axe, recovering in hospital  after
feigning death by firing squad. 9. A 19-year old woman
stabbed 29 times, later had a miscarriage in a refugee
hospital. 10. Body left to rot in roadside pond.
Six months after the fact, these were among the
most inflammatory photographs of the Asian conflict
ever shown to the American public and an early use
of the term "Rape of Nanking". These must be added
to evidence that was steering (a still largely isolationist)
United States public opinion to a stronger pro-Chinese/
anti-Japanese position. The next week, a photograph
essay described Chinese troops going into action and
achieving a victory; a week after that, war photographer
Robert Capa's photographs depicted Chinese civilians
witnessing air battles over the city of Hankow. Capa's
images of war would become icons of the era even
though  these  photographs  of  a  mourning  Chinese
mother and the city of Canton under fierce Japanese
bombardment were not reproduced in the millions as
were  those  of  baby  Ping  Mei.  The  text  predicted
accurately  that these images of  dead and wounded
and a city destroyed were curtain raisers to the next
war in Europe [49].  LIFE had shot its bolt as these
were the last Nanking references in 1938. There were
eight more issues in which China was mentioned, but
nothing  was  as  sensational  as  the  Nanking  photo-
graphs [50].
Notwithstanding  LIFE's larger readership, in Novem-
ber it was LOOK that delivered the most graphic pho-
tographs of Japanese outrages (probably in Nanking),
including the Japanese bayoneting of Chinese prison-
ers  of  war  while  soldiers  watched  (Figure  7).  The
LOOK captions were as graphic as the pictures. Under
the headline "Killing For  Fun!" the text read: "Hands
Tied, Chinese prisoners are used as live targets for
bayonets  of  Japanese  recruits.  In  the  foreground a
captive is being tormented. Another (left rear) is being
stabbed to death. A third (center) has just received
the death thrust. A fourth (rear) is being driven into
the pit" [51,52]. Additional text on the page charged
the  Japanese  with  butchering  Chinese  and  burying
them alive, merely for amusement, or to inspire raw
recruits to kill. The writer explained:
"We are sending you some pictures of killers in the
act of killing. We have plenty of hard boiled corres-
pondents  here—Steele  of  the  Chicago  Tribune,
Durdin  of  the  New  York  Times,  Beldon,  an  ex-
United Press reporter, Victor Keen of the New York
Herald Tribune, and others and all of them reckoned
the pictures to be the worst things they had ever
seen in China, bombing aftermaths and battlefields
thrown in.
The pictures were taken in Nanking and Soochow
recently, that can be judged by the fact that the
men are in their summer uniforms. In other words,
the killings happened at least six months after the
occupation of those cities, when some blood lust,
however bad, was to be expected. Thus, these pic-
tures must come under the heading of diversion, or
else the executions were staged to put the killer in-
stinct into freshly drafted troops.
The Japanese soldier-photographers sent the films
to Shanghai for developing and printing. They sent
them to a Japanese-owned shop and Chinese em-
ployees did the natural thing in exceeding the ori-
ginal printing order. Hence these pictures found the
light.
These Sons of Heaven went one worse than the
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Romans who, even if they sent their gladiators into
the  arena  wearing half-inch  armor,  at  least  gave
their victims a short sword and a sporting chance.
As you will perceive, all these Chinese soldiers and
civilians were led into the killing pit with their arms
pinioned."
Captions  explained that  these were Japanese  re-
cruits at bayonet drill. Using Chinese prisoners as tar-
gets was a practice that was considered the proper
way  to  season  newcomers.  This  photograph  was
among sixteen souvenir photographs taken by Japan-
ese soldiers. Duplicated secretly, these grisly images
made their way to the West eventually and the entire
set was used at the postwar Nanking War Crimes Trial
in Tokyo (1946–1948).
On the following page, a photograph depicted Ja-
panese soldiers watching execution of Chinese men.
The caption read: "Rivers Run Red as Chinese are ex-
ecuted  beside  a  stream.  Several  hundred  Japanese
soldiers are gathered around, watching the slaughter.
The man in the foreground is toppling over dead. His
head may be seen in the crook of his arm. The next
victim is in place" (Figure 8).
A second picture claimed, "Five Chinese Prisoners
are Buried Alive, in this, one of the most gruesome of
all  wartime pictures. Enraged by the stoic calm with
which the Chinese defenders are meeting their attack,
the Japanese are more determined than ever to bring
them to their knees. This war, now in its third year, is
one of the most brutal in history" (Figure 9).
A  larger  photograph  depicted  Japanese  soldiers
with fixed bayonets aimed at two bound Chinese, one
tall, one short (Figure 10). The text stated: "The Big
Boy  Was  Beheaded because  he  stepped on a  tele-
phone wire, but the Japanese soldiers spared the life
of  the  little  fellow.  Because  of  a  shortage  of  food,
many  prisoners  in  the  bloody  arena  are  beheaded.
Both  the  Japanese  and  Chinese  face  death  with  a
calmness astonishing to westerners" [51].
Figure  7. Japanese  soldiers  bayonet  Chinese
prisoners. Source: Keystone/Getty Images.
Figure 8. Beheading a Chinese soldier. Source:
Robyn Beck/Getty Images.
Figure 9. Burying Chinese prisoners alive. Source:
Keystone/Getty Images.
Figure 10. Japanese abuse young Chinese cap-
tives. Source: LOOK Magazine.
Another image of live burials appeared in the journ-
al Pictorial Review with a story by Betty Graham titled,
"Hundreds of Thousands Slaughtered in New Wave of
Bestial Jap Atrocities" [53-56]. The photographs' im-
pact should be included in explaining a Gallup Poll rise
in  anti-Japanese  American  public  opinion  [57].  If  a
photo's visual syntax is universally comprehensible, it
is  difficult  to  assert  what  the  viewers'  possible  re-
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sponse to atrocity photographs would have been: per-
haps a combination of horror, anger and to a lesser
degree in isolationist America, a desire to punish the
perpetrators [7,58-61]. A recent historiographical book
on the moral, political and educational aspects of the
atrocity surveyed Chinese, Japanese and transnational
authors, but did not attempt to gauge the impact on
public opinion that pictures like these had when circu-
lated in the millions [62].
Nanking  disappeared  from  public  discourse  after
1938. Some found the atrocity stories too shocking,
believing they were similar to (untruthful) black pro-
paganda of World War I. Others had inverse attitudes:
sympathy  for  the  Chinese  in  Asia  and  prejudice  to
Chinese living in their city. Perhaps because of squeam-
ishness  about rape and barbarism ([10], p. 16; [63-
69]), or because they violated standards of decency
or because of general provincialism, the Nanking horror
slipped from public consciousness until  America was
at war. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 became
America's  rallying  cry.  Only  then  did  the  'Rape  of
Nanking' join wartime iconography [70,71].
In contrast to the United States,  Canada had no
weekly national pictorial magazine. Its primary nation-
al magazine, Maclean's, said nothing about the Nank-
ing atrocity. Only in February 1938, did a columnist
from London mention Japanese-British relations and a
Japanese  diplomat's  cynical  comment  referring  to
Chinese  aggression  in  Shanghai.  The  emphasis  of
Maclean's  was exclusively  Eurocentric,  with  a  single
reference in March to  the possibility  of  war  coming
across the Pacific [72]. Taking The Gazette (Montreal)
as a typical English Canadian newspaper, its coverage
of the fall of Nanking had no photographs, was based
on the Durdin and Abend articles  in  the  New York
Times, and only once in December spoke of the Ja-
panese  soldiers'  "breakdown  of  discipline".  Late  in
January, in a dispatch from Shanghai headlined "Nanking
Captors Run Amok", Abend claimed his sources were
based on consular  reports  whose contents  about  as-
saults on women and very young girls were "actually
unprintable".  A day later,  an  editorial  reiterated the
Times' story and Japanese military authorities' admis-
sion that the depredations were "blunders". As shocking
as  this  singular  news  coverage  was,  the  Canadian
press did not purchase the extant images to follow-up
the story. In the linguistic and cultural gulf that existed
between  Asia  and  Canada,  the  long  history  of
ethnocentricity  and  conservatism  demonstrated  the
failure of Nanking to register as anything more than a
tragic fact [73].
3. American Newsreels and Nanking
One of the more puzzling elements surrounding the
Nanking Atrocity is the American newsreels' failure to
cover the event. Henry Luce's The March of Time, the
premier newsreel series of its kind, ignored China in
prewar issues, other than a March 1936 mention of
Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Typically, its narra-
tion used "other" voices to mouth potentially hazard-
ous  judgments  and  one  issue  commented  about
militant  Japan:  "but  as Japan's  militarists  march on
behind  their  Emperor,  observers  may  well  wonder
what a nation whose war dogs go mad at home might
do  if  allowed  to  run  loose  throughout  the  world"
([74],  pp.  85,  86).  In  December  1937,  after  the
Japanese sinking of the USS Panay, nationalist rhetoric
inflamed anti-Japanese public opinion.
The March of Time series was a barometer of the
growing influence  of  moving  images  upon news.  It
became the most widely distributed newsreel in the
United States with an audience of 12 million viewers
in 5236 theatres in 168 cities ([74], pp. 138, 154). If
there was a dearth of, or no footage available, series
director Louis de Rochemont used re-enactment freely
([75]; see [74], pp. 134, 228, 237). In a prewar issue
titled "Japan-Master of  the Orient",  the narrator re-
viewed Japan's  "record of shameful unprovoked ag-
gression" without alluding to the horrors of Nanking.
Hesitant to condemn the whole of Japan, he stated,
"sober Japanese wonder fearfully  how long the pa-
tience of the great western nations will brook this law-
less threat to the peace of the world" ([74], p. 241).
In December 1941 "Battlefields of  the Pacific"  dealt
with Japanese military aggression generally.  In fact,
between January 1942 and August 1945, the series
analyzed the Pacific war in only four issues, devoting
one general  newsreel  to China.  The March of  Time
mentioned Nanking just once in 1942. Ignoring China
echoed prewar American isolationist sentiment, owner
Henry Luce's laisser faire policy toward the series, its
Eurocentric outlook, or Louis de Rochemont's indiffer-
ence  toward  the  Chinese.  Not  surprisingly,  after
December 1941, American interest in the Pacific re-
volved around concern for American servicemen ex-
clusively ([76]; see [74], pp. 134, 254, 276).
In contrast, a sobering treatment of the Japanese
enemy occurred in one of the War Department's pro-
paganda series Why We Fight, made under the super-
vision of celebrated Hollywood director Frank Capra.
In "The Battle of China" (1944), John Magee's Nank-
ing footage was integrated into Chinese-manufactured
atrocity images that had appeared in an earlier Cana-
dian newsreel from the National Film Board. Actuality
images included a point blank execution of two bound
Chinese prisoners, accompanied by the following nar-
ration, "but again, Japanese power was too great and
after a battle lasting but a few days, the city fell to the
invaders. In their occupation of Nanking, the Japs out-
did  themselves in  barbarism.  The Japanese  soldiers
went berserk.  They raped and tortured. They killed
and butchered. In one of the bloodiest massacres in
recorded history, they murdered 40,000 men women
and children…" Thus began the Chinese death toll de-
bate  ([77],  see  [54]),  but  the  appalling  images
showed victims who had been stabbed, raped, set on
fire or nearly beheaded ([78]; see [20], pp. 156–157).
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The  graphic  narration  spared  nothing.  "…But  those
who lived might better have died, for  the horror of
their twisted and torn bodies was worse than death…
This  nightmare of  cruelty  was all  the more horrible
because it was deliberately planned by the Japanese
high command to tear the heart out of the Chinese
people once and forever…" [79].
One can surmise how engaging and effective this
inflammatory imagery was, even if the audience for
this film was much smaller than the first film in this
series "Prelude to War", which was mandatory viewing
for millions of American recruits. Released in the fall
of 1944, "The Battle of China" was withdrawn briefly,
and then reissued midway through 1945, reaching an
audience of 3.75 million. One critic has labeled it Hol-
lywood fairy-tale propaganda that strained credibility
because  it  ignored  Mao's  communist  armies  (Com-
munism  was  still  a  forbidden  word  in  mainstream
American media) and pretended that China was ex-
pelling the Japanese invader ([80], pp. 176, 184).
The images trigger revulsion, but the propaganda
objective was to engage viewers to believe that the
Chinese themselves would defeat the enemy. The nar-
ration boasted, "…and then it happened. That which
Sun Yat Sen had dreamed of, that which Chiang Kai-
Shek had toiled for, that which is stronger than stone
walls that had surrounded China: the will to resist. In
their last bloody blow the Japanese had accomplished
that which four thousand years had failed to bring into
being—a united China…" Accompanying this verbiage
were  pictures  of  Chinese  leaders  exhorting  their
people,  reiterating  the  message  of  unity.  The  race
card was played more viciously as the narration con-
cluded that Japan planned to conquer North America
and the  world  when "the Germans would join with
their  buck-toothed  pals  coming  over  from  Siberia"
[80]. If nothing else, racism could be counted on to
generate emotion.
4. Canadian Newsreels and Asia
For its part, Canada's military engagement in Asia had
proven to be disastrous in 1941, with the fall of Hong
Kong and the ignominious surrender of two ill trained
and unseasoned Canadian battalions ([81]; see [82],
p. 109). Learning of Japanese brutality toward all pris-
oners of  war,  Canada's  film propaganda chief,  John
Grierson, tried to rally morale without stoking racist
fires. On the heels of these military fiascos, this was a
difficult task, since the Canadian populace largely ap-
proved the government's racially motivated removal of
Japanese Canadians from coastal British Columbia in
1942 ([83]; see [84], pp. 82–96).
Invited to  Canada in  1939 to  establish  and then
lead the National Film Board, Grierson produced mor-
ale  building  theatrical  and  nontheatrical  short  films
monthly to inform citizens and soldiers. Emphasizing
propaganda as  "education",  the  films  systematically
shaped perceptions, manipulated cognitions and dir-
ected behavior ([85], pp. 11, 78–89). Film Board pro-
ductions included four theatrical issues on Asia from
1942 to 1944, Inside Fighting China, The Mask of Nip-
pon,  When  Asia  Speaks and  Fortress  Japan.  These
newsreels, reaching two million at home and up to ten
million internationally, defined Canada's Asian propa-
ganda strategy: to vilify Japanese aggression, not the
Japanese people. In July 1942  Inside Fighting China
showed the film clip (described above) of Japanese
executing  Chinese  captives.  Lorne  Greene,  the  pa-
ternal voice of democracy in Canada's wartime news-
reels, asserted soberly that the Japanese were using
liquid fire, gas, and bacterial warfare to butcher civil-
ians and soldiers. The narration concluded that China,
with communists and nationalists united, was destroy-
ing the myth of Nippon the invulnerable. There was
no mention of the Nanking atrocity ([4], pp. 215–216,
224–225).
Grierson's  propaganda approach was  ideologically
simple:  portray  the  Japanese  as  individually  trust-
worthy but collectively treacherous. This theme was
central to  The Mask of Nippon, in September 1942.
The film began with a crude physical characterization
of  Japanese soldiers as "little  men, quick and wiry;
their uniforms slovenly, their faces, even in the heat of
battle,  tawny  masks,  black,  expressionless".  There
followed a series of quick cuts to Japanese troops in
combat, and a shot of Japanese soldiers brutalizing a
crowd  of  Chinese  civilians,  with  one  seizing  and
rough-handling  a  mother  and  child.  Then  another
threw the  child  into  the  air  as  the  other's  bayonet
pitched the child's body out of the frame. There fol-
lowed clips of bound Chinese prisoners being thrown
into  a  pit,  being  buried  alive,  shot  at  point  blank
range, and finally civilians dragging a corpse, literally
in ribbons. The narration was accompanied by a chor-
us of female screams, heightened by a high pitched
Oriental  flute.  This  was  the  most  atrocity-filled war
footage ever shown to Canadians. The crowd scene,
the burying alive of prisoners,  the woman, and the
bayoneted  child  were  in  fact  staged,  taken  from a
Chinese-made propaganda film and inserted as actu-
ality footage along with segments of the Magee film.
Mixing  black  (staged)  and  white  (authentic)  propa-
ganda was allowable if the result articulated the true
larger picture. The narration made reference neither
to Nanking nor to the provenance of the footage. The
evocative impact of soldiers bayoneting the child re-
mained indelible as audiences would have absorbed
the whole as "authentic". A number of stills from the
staged sequences continue today to be used, (prob-
ably  unknowingly),  as  actuality  photographs  from
Nanking.  A  wall  of  verbiage,  accompanied by  stock
iconography  of  Japanese  cultural  images,  reminded
the viewer that the enemy was dangerous, but beat-
able psychologically and militarily. In July 1944  Fort-
ress Japan gave an account of the Allied advance on
beleaguered Japan, using footage of dead Japanese
soldiers  to  demonstrate  that  the  Allied  drive  would
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break  Japan's  militaristic  spirit:  "and  so,  a  nation
which has ever held life cheap, prepares to practice
once again its ancient arts of death…" Tom Daly, the
editor, defended these Asia films, noting that they did
not substitute emotional racism for a true thing nor
did they deny the Japanese were intelligent people.
He and director/writer Stuart Legg had no misgivings
about using the Chinese-manufactured (black) propa-
ganda to drive home the point. Black propaganda is
usually defined as material where the role of the au-
thorities is deliberately obscured, or where it appears
to come from the people at which it is aimed. Audi-
ences had no idea that the most brutal images were
staged sequences ([4], pp. 219–220) (Figure 11).
Figure 11. 'Child' (a doll) bayoneted in Chinese
propaganda film. Source: National Film Board of
Canada.
5. Japanese Propaganda and the Nanking 
Atrocity
If  Canada's  propaganda  tried  to  keep  truth  as  its
touchstone, the Japanese had no qualms about em-
ploying black propaganda in their sophisticated cam-
paign  to  deny  the  Nanking  atrocity.  The  Japanese
public learned of the fall and occupation of Nanking
through  jingoist  headlines  and  newsreel  pictures  of
the  victory  parade  led  by  their  triumphant  general.
The Japan Advertiser boasted of  a  barbaric  contest
between  two  lieutenants  as  to  who  could  behead
more Chinese prisoners. The tally of 106 to 105 led
them to call  lightheartedly for a new contest to re-
solve which of them to name the "winner". After the
war, the Allied Wartime Tribunal used the celebrated
"killing contest" to condemn the two to hanging for
war crimes ([20], pp. 170–171; [86]; see also [54],
pp.  141, 147).  Many in  this  culture that  celebrated
"bushido" never understood why (Figure 12).
Sanitized Japanese newsreels showed troops fight-
ing their way into Nanking, followed by "Bonsai" vic-
tory salutes on the city walls. To offset rumors at home
of civilian atrocities, Tokyo invited Japanese visitors to
tour the city in January 1938. The tourists gave sweets
to Chinese children and saw nothing of the ongoing rape
and carnage. Japanese newsmen took pictures of "spon-
taneous" New-Year's celebrations in which gleeful resid-
ents  also  welcomed  Japanese  soldiers  who  handed
out sweets (Figure 13). Other photographs depicted
children receiving care from a Japanese medical doctor.
Figure  12. Japanese  soldiers'  killing  contest.
Source: The Japan Advertiser.
Figure 13. Japanese soldiers handing out sweets
to Chinese children. Source: The Japan Advertiser.
Figure  14. Japanese  propaganda  in  China.
Source: Unknown Japanese.
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A few reports had the audacity to declare that the
Chinese, not the Japanese, were responsible for the
looting, raping and burning. The occupying forces also
dropped  leaflets  promising  food  and  clothing  if  the
Chinese returned to their homes. Thousands of hope-
ful victims left refugee camps in response to a leaflet
featuring a Japanese soldier holding a Chinese child in
his arms and distributing rice by the bagful  (Figure
14). Black propaganda beckoned Chinese to return to
their  homes to  receive food and clothing. Undiscip-
lined Japanese troops then victimized many who re-
turned [87].
6. Conclusion
This study has argued that because the world was not
yet buried in a surfeit of images, pictures commanded
a degree  of  moral  authority.  Decades  later,  a  stark
postmodernist  view articulated by Susan Sontag in-
sisted that photographs from "the slaughter bench of
history" do not necessarily induce pathos and senti-
ment, nor are they the source of ethical and political
knowledge. She divorced moral and ethical judgment
from the experience of viewing, in part because of the
sheer volume of images in our daily lives. In contrast,
John Taylor denies that the surfeit of images provokes
weariness and distrust, claiming instead that the very
awfulness of images can and does define civility. Mod-
ernism needs reconsideration, he believes, and through
it we remember the importance of images' connection
to morality ([59], pp. 1–11).
Observing the still photographs and newsreels de-
voted to Japanese depredations in Nanking, a number
of salient points emerge. In the relatively new practice
of twentieth century mass spectatorship, there came
into being a new public discourse and public sphere in
which  media-generated  imagery  operated  on  both
conscious and unconscious levels ([61], pp. 112, 113).
It is not possible to state with certainty the effect of
the images upon the millions who experienced them
but it  is  likely that the widely circulated still  photo-
graphs in  LIFE and  LOOK contributed to changing or
confirming public opinion about militant Japan. Iconic
photographs such as those of baby Ping Mei in the ru-
ins of a Shanghai railway station or Japanese soldiers
bayoneting  Chinese  POWs  compelled  a  degree  of
moral  awareness.  Though  the  event  was  about  far
away  alien  victimization,  the  pain  and  identification
they  projected  were,  we  believe,  unmistakable.  In
1937 the world was on the brink of conflagration and
even if  their  impact  is  dulled by  context  and time,
their power to summon humanist impulses stands in
contrast to Sontag's insistence that images blunt mor-
ality  and  serve  to  promote  pathos  and  sentiment
([39], pp. 43, 44, 175, 176).
Earlier  we  observed  the  prewar  sinking  of  the
American gunboat  Panay. It had a probable catalytic
effect on the public that interpreted it emotionally as
a national affront, not only because it was captured
on film, but also because the press reinforced its im-
portance for weeks. The lines of patrons at newsreel
theatres demonstrated the American public's taste for
"news" as images, as sentiment, and even in the pre-
war world, as a form of jingoist sport. Whatever the
motivation, later public opinion surveys demonstrated
American sympathies were measurably pro-China and
anti-Japan following exposure to the visual and print
information.
That said, the trauma of being a combatant in war
produced a willingness in both the United States and
Canada to use images as public opinion leaders em-
ploying white and black propaganda. One can appreci-
ate how the "Rape of Nanking", synonymous with Ja-
panese barbarity,  assumed its iconic role. The 1942
and 1944 newsreel pictures of the Nanking atrocities
reinforced anti-Japanese public opinion at the least. If
John  Magee's  actuality  footage  from  Nanking  and
staged images of panicked civilians in  The March of
Time stirred American audiences to demand revenge,
so too did the lurid theatrical bayoneting of the child
in  Canada's  newsreel,  The  Mask  of  Nippon.  But
propaganda  chief  John  Grierson  insisted  that  such
images  should  be  balanced  by  showing  the  human
side of the Japanese; Canada's propaganda goal was
to  ensure  that  patterns  of  peace,  not  revenge,
ultimately  prevailed  ([88],  pp.  140,  142,  143,  150,
151; see also [89], pp. 79–92). Being wartime, no one
went on record to protest suspected image manipula-
tion,  a  clear  suspicion  if  one analyzes  the  perfectly
positioned camera and actors. In Japan, the "killing
contest"  aside,  (citizens  in  Japan's  militarist  society
accepted  the  warrior's  cliché  Kill  or  Be  Killed)  the
Japanese  produced  their  own  black  propaganda  to
convince  citizens  of  their  humane  treatment  of  the
Chinese noncombatant population. One may conclude
that if such images had their intended salutary effect,
later evidence demonstrates they were dishonest to
the core.
One of the great tragedies in recounting the Nank-
ing event is the issue of females being "taken away"
as witness Lewis Smythe expressed it so delicately in
1938. The "comfort women" controversy of the 1990s,
triggered by current feminist discourse, raised the is-
sue  of  sexual  slavery  and  sexual  assault,  but  little
about the history that led to it. The fact that the Ja-
panese command never planned for the sexual needs
of its occupying troops was one catalyst that led to
widespread rape ([13], pp. 115–148). Subsequently,
Japan attached (mainly Korean) "comfort women" to
its troops to prevent a similar catastrophe from recur-
ring. As well, such depredations were meant to humi-
liate the conquered populations. Today these surviving
Korean females wait  for a full  public apology. Years
later, Japanese servicemen's 'souvenir photographs' of
the female depredations served to demonstrate how
powerful a photograph can be in terms of its ability to
enrage  civilized  consciousness,  no  matter  what  the
citizenship of the beholder is, and to remind one that
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suppression of  the transgression of  wartime rape is
too often ignored in consideration of public propriety.
Today  the  photograph  below  of  this  shamefully
humiliated victim stands in a prominent place in the
Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall (Figure 15).
One is reminded of John Taylor's reference to how
images  of  horror  function  cognitively  as  a  peculiar
blend of fear and disgust. They are both an affront
and threat that people may share. Citing John Keane,
he reminds us of how exposure to horror functions to
keep memories alive, to heighten awareness of cur-
rent cruelties, to raise issues about whether violence
is justified, and to encourage remedies for savagery.
At the same time one never knows if viewers respond
to pictures and film with curiosity, esthetic distance or
emotional involvement. What we have demonstrated
in this research is that preserved images become part
of historical memory [90-92]. Life and Look's publica-
tion of atrocious photographs posed the question of
what standard was used to decide what was proper to
see.  It  is  clear  that  a  regular  diet  of  such  images
would have provoked reactions of disgust, hence the
media  themselves  determined  taste  and  tone.  This
study has documented their chronology and contribu-
tion to historical public discourse. Once war came, the
moving images of Nanking served to remind the pub-
lic that the enemy's acts had been hateful and that
common  action  would  lead  to  Japan's  defeat.
Republishing these images in 2014 is meant to waken
the public from moral slumber, indifference and histor-
ical amnesia and to remind present and future perpet-
rators around the world that there must be a reckon-
ing for their crimes against humanity.
Why did China let Nanking slip from postwar public
scrutiny? A faltering Nationalist China ignored the at-
rocity in exchange for Japanese political support in the
late 1940s; after the Communists formed China's gov-
ernment in 1949, their own political  expediency de-
manded that the shame be ignored. Since the 1990s,
circulation  of  Nanking  atrocity  photographs  has  re-
vitalized the event's iconic status. This relates to the
emergence of a confident China, where nationalists at
home and abroad demand historical justice, as well as
to surviving Korean "comfort women" who claim the
same.  Japan's  revisionists  refuse  to  face  history
squarely because this would require that nation to re-
linquish  its  postwar  status  as  victim.  Contemporary
conservative guardians continue to ignore the Nanking
atrocity in Japan's history books. Japanese denial of
scope and depth aside, the Nanking outrage serves a
positive  propaganda  function  of  reminding  govern-
ments that they are answerable for the acts of their
soldiers. New generations of soldiers and civilian col-
laborators need to know that if they are told to obey
and to ignore their conscience, they must, in the long
run, answer in the court of posterity. 
The absence of official postwar Japanese regret or
willingness  to  pay  reparations  can  be  explained  by
Cold War politics that made it easier for public memory
to  lapse  ([20],  pp.  209–214;  [93,94]).  Iris  Chang
concluded that Japan's refusal to accept responsibility
for the victims of Nanking was a reflection of human
nature: she thought unspeakable acts become banalit-
ies if they occur far enough away to pose no personal
threat ([20], p. 221; [95,96]). That is one sad conclu-
sion to draw about the Japanese war in Asia. Americ-
an  postwar  interest  in  Japan  had  more  to  do  with
establishing a constitution and democracy than with
accounting for Japanese brutality in China. As histori-
ans, some perpetrators, and many in the public now
demand an explanation for this historical crime, one
recalls  Holocaust  survivor  Elie  Wiesel's  sober  words
"Whoever hears a witness to the Holocaust becomes a
witness and messenger too" [97]. The unleashing of
the Japanese soldiers on Nanking should not be al-
lowed to stand as only another sad statistic of human
misery. We believe the images referred to in this study
impose rather than create a space for meanings ([98],
pp.  3–5)  and  serve  a  double  purpose:  they  monu-
mentalize  shame  until  Japan  accepts  its  moral  re-
sponsibility,  after  which  proper  mourning  and  the
integration  of  the  collective  memory  of  both  Japan
and China  will  be  satisfied.  Second,  they  may  also
serve to help Japan adopt the politics of atonement
officially.  If  this  results  in  some  lingering  private
resentment, at the very least, it will at last force a fair
and ongoing public dialogue between Asia's two Great
Powers.
Figure 15. The humiliation of  sexually  ravaged
women. Source: Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall.
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